The impacts of four major tax reform proposals on the level of interest rates and the allocation of the American capital stock are derived. The four plans are Bradley-Gephardt, Kemp-Kasten, Treasury I and Treasury II. The allocation is among seven types of nonresidential capital, rental housing, and owner occupied housing held by households in five different income classes.
Supply-siders believe that the lowering of marginal tax rates will increase real income and Treasury tax revenue by inducing greater work effort and saving. While virtually all economists accept this argument in principle, many, if not most, believe the magnitude of these responses to be small. We have not modeled such responses and effectively assume that the tax reforms are revenue neutral and will not alter either the level or distribution of aftertax income.1 (While households receive a tax cut on average, the tax increase for businesses will result in lower real returns to some factor of production and thus to households who own all factors.) This paper begins with a general discussion of rental user costs for real capital, the primary determinants of capital allocation, and then presents calculations of the user costs under current law. Section II contains a description of the allocation simulation model, and analyses of the four tax reform proposals, including their inflation neutrality, are reported in Section III. The model contains seven types of nonresidential capital, rental housing and owner-occupied housing. Households in six income classes with endogenous tenure choices are considered. A given capital sLock is allocated among the various capital components, with the level of interest rates adjusting to maintain aggregate demand equal to the fixed stock.
We conclude that interest rates would decline significantly in response to all reforms except Kemp-Kasten: three percentage points if Treasury I were 
I. Investment Hurdle Rates or User Costs

General Considerations
As is well known (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967) , the decision to invest depends on whether the present value of the expected revenue from investment exceeds the supply price of capital, and on marginal investments the two will be equal. After allowance for taxation, the equilibrium condition for investment is (r+d+T ii) lT (1) where T is the business tax rate, p is the gross marginal product of capital, r is the real after-tax financing rate, d is the economic depreciation rate, T is the concurrent equivalent tax rate on inflationary gains, ii is the expected inflation rate, and k is the investment tax credit.2 In general, z is the present value of the stream of tax depreciation allowances, TAXDEPt, obtained by discounting the stream of depreciation allowances by the required nominal after-tax financing rate: -3--N TAXDEP z= (2) t=l [ (l+r) (l+Tr)] where N is the depreciation period of the asset. The right side of equation (1) is the "investment hurdle rate" or rental user cost for a particular asset.
The lower the user cost, the greater will be production of the asset, and the lower will be the productivity of the marginal investment (p).
In a "neutral" tax system, the net user and thus net marginal productivities (p -d) would be the same for all equally-risky assets. This can be achieved in a variety of ways. For example, with k = 0, -t = 0 and either z = 1 -expensing --or -r = 0, then p -d = r. Alternatively, with k = 0, -r = 0 and z = d/(r + d) --tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation, then p -d = r/(l-t) . In either case, if the r's were equal for all assets, the tax system would be neutral across them.3
Assuming that firms use a fixed fraction of debt, b, for financing all investments, the real after-tax financing rate can be expressed as r [b(l-$-r) i + (1-b) (l-y-r)e -ir]/(l+ir) ,
where and y-, respectively, are the portions of interest and equity returns that are deductible at the business level, and e is the required nominal return to investors. (Currently = 1 and y = 0.)
Portfolio equilibrium of investors requires that (l_Te)e = (l-x)i +,
where e is the rate at which equity returns are taxed at the personal level,
x is the relevant tax rate for taxable interest (the lower of the personal tax rate and that implicit in tax-exempt yields) , and is the risk premium required on equity investments. For all investments except owner-occupied housing of low and middle income households, x is the tax rate implicit in tax-exempt yields x. Substituting (4) into (3), the real after-tax financing rate for capital other than owner-occupied housing is: (Fullerton, 1985) . More generally, The tax rate implicit in long-term tax exempt yields is assumed to be given by: These tax rates are discussed in more detail in Hendershott and Ling, 1985. For all investments other than real estate, b = 1/3. The minimum 0.5 reflects an assumed average wealth constraint on households;
the optimal b, for unconstrained households is likely zero.
The assumed loan-to-value ratios far exceed the 0.33 to 0.4 average economy-wide ratio observed for owner-occupied housing. Such ratios are heavily influenced by older owning households who have repaid their mortgages.5
These are relatively insensitive to housing rental costs (see note 11).
Households under forty use far more debt (the average loan-to-value ratio for first-time homebuyers in 1984 was 87 percent) and often make quite long-term housing decisions. It is the decisions of such households that we are attempting to capture, and their present-value weighted average loan-to-value ratio is probably near two-thirds.
Based upon Ibbotson-Sinquefield calculations, we assume 1 for corporate equities is 0.075, and thus the risk premium for corporate assets, which have a one-third loan-to-value ratio, is (l-b) = 0.05. The risk premium for depreciable real estate investors is also about 0.075.6 Because real-estate assets are presumed to have a loan-to-value ratio of two-thirds, the premium, for these assets is only 0.025. We assume this also to be the premium for owner-occupied housing. This relatively low premium is consistent with owners having certainty with regard to their "vacancy" and "breakage" rates and thus greater certainty with respect to their net operating incomes than is the case with rental properties.
The risk-adjusted net (of depreciation) investment hurdle rates for alternative investments are reported in Table 2 for three different inflation rates. In the base case, = 0.05 and I = 0.11. We also consider higher (0.10) and lower (0.0) inflation rates. The interest rates associated with these inflation rates were generated by the model described in the next section. As can be seen, di/dir = 1.48, midway between the nontax (unity) and
Under a neutral tax system, these rates would be the same for all assets,
As can be seen, this is not true under current law. At a five percent inflation rate, the tax-favored assets are equipment, with its generous tax credit, and housing, especially that occupied by high-income households. The tax-penalized assets are inventories, whose inflationary gains are not indexed, and corporate structures, especially industrial structures which receive no tax credit. Also, corporate investments are penalized relative to noncorporate, owing to their double taxation, and risky assets are penalized relative to less risky real estate assets (Bulow and Suiimers, 1984) 8 The difference in hurdle rates for industrial structures and housing, on average, is 4½ percentage points. The difference in the cost of housing for high and low income owners is over 3 percentage points. Moreover, the higher is inflation, the greater are the biases in favor of rental and high-income owner housing and is the penalty against corporate investments.
II. The Capital Allocation Model9
An Overview
The basic model allocates a fixed private capital stock among various classes of nonresidential and residential capital. The allocation depends on the rental or user costs for the capital components, the price elasticities of demand with respect to the rental costs, and the elasticities of homeownership with respect to the cost of owning versus renting. The interest rate adjusts in response to tax changes so as to maintain the aggregate demand for capital at its initial level. The fixed capital stock assumption implies zero interest elasticity of saving. For all assets except rental housing, the demand for the asset is determined by the investor in the asset, be it a corporation, unincorporated business or a household. For rental housing, demand is determined by renters, based upon their incomes and the market rent level. Thus, the total quantity of rental housing, like the total quantity of owner housing, is built up as the sum of the demands by households in different income brackets. Table 4 indicates divisions of the demand for housing across six income classes. The first three columns contain the income classes selected, the division of 80 million households across these classes, and the assumed ownership rates for these classes. Columns 4 and 5 give the distribution of the income of owners and renters across these classes. Column 4 is the product of columns 1, 2 and 3 divided by the sum of the products. In the column 5 calculation, the fraction of households owning is replaced by the fraction renting. Columns 6 and 7 give the distribution of the owned and rented stocks.
These distributions and the ownership rates were calculated from model equations described below. The equations imply an aggregate ownership rate of 0.56, significantly below the current observed rate which is heavily influenced by tenure decisions made during the 1970s when the cost of owning was far lower than today because real after-tax mortgage rates were so much lower. Put another way, if real after-tax mortgage rates remain at the early l980s level, we would anticipate a significant decline in the aggregate ownership rate over time (holding demographic factors constant) . Given that ownership rates do not reflect a long run equilibrium, the distribution of the housing stock between owned and rented also does not. The assumed equilibrium distribution is that shown in Table 4 , not that in Table 1 . That is,. 10 percent of the existing owner-occupied housing stock f (2269-2032)/2269] has been shifted from owner to rental.
Model Equations
The model explains 13 rental costs: seven for the different types of nonresidential capital, five for owner-occupied housing of households in our five income ranges, and one for rental housing. As discussed in the previous section, these costs depend on numerous provisions of the tax law, the depreciation rate of the asset, the expected inflation rate and the level of interest rates in the economy. Moreover, rental costs for household tenure choice decisions (s,) differ from those for quantity demanded decisions (p.) because the tax rates relevant to the after-tax financing rates differ (see Table 1 ). We summarize the rental cost equations as Pk(tk1di,l]) (l)- (7) p. = p.(tax,d.ir,i)
= .(ta.,d,ir,i). Cobb-Douglass [Berndt(1976) ], these demand equations can be written as
- (25) where the Zk are constants (depending on given outputs) and the are the rental costs.
The housing demand and tenure choice equations come from the specification of a translog indirect utility function for households (King, 1980) and the empirical application of it to the ownership decision (Hendershott and Shilling, 1982) . The estimated odds of owning equation was -13-
J Taking antilogs and solving, the ownership rates for the five highest income classes are 0, = eLj/(l_eLj), Lastly, equality between the sum of the demands and the existing capital stock determines the level of interest rates in the economy:
j Given current tax law and assumed levels of the interest and expected inflation rates, the k' p., , and p are known (listed, net of the d's in Table 2 ). The NK were listed in Table 3 , and the OH. and RH. calculations k j j were reported in Table 4 . The o. and HH, were also listed in However, most 5-year equipment would be reclassified as 6,7 and even 10 year equipment. For industrial structures, tax depreciation would be more favorable only at inflation rates of 6 percent or greater. From equation (7) and the surrounding discussion, T is a weighted average of T./2 (one-tenth weight) and the capital gains tax rate (nine-tenths weight), The own-equity financing rates and loan-to-value ratios for owner-occupied housing are fully specified by equations (6), (7), and (9) and the provisions of the reform proposals. For Bradley-Gephardt, the surtax applies to the three highest income classes; thus own-equity financing (the tax-exempt interest rate being the opportunity cost) is cheaper than debt financing and a 50 percent loan-to-value ratio is assumed. The interest indexation feature of Treasury I (3< 1) would also have a major impact on the opportunity cost of own equity financing generally (as well as on tax-exempt yields --see note d to Table 6 Because only 55%/38% of nominal interest income would be taxed in a five/ten percent inflation world, the tax rate relevant to own equity financing would be 55%/38% of the marginal rates shown in Table 6 or the tax-exempt rate, whichever is less.
The partial dividend exclusion is of little import in our model because Impacts on Interest Rates and Capital Allocation, 5% Inflation 
Inflation Neutrality
Only Treasury I and Kemp-Kasten make serious attempts at achieving inflation neutrality, the latter by proposing effective expensing of capital outlays and the former by setting tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation and indexing both depreciation allowances and interest. As can be seen in Table 10 , Kemp-Kasten comes close to achieving neutrality: no asset other than inventories changes by more than one percent in response to a ten To utilize this relation, the t's must be identified with a tax rate in our model. Higher income households are less likely to be wealth constrained than other households and are thus more likely to behave as the life-cycle model suggests. Higher income households also do most of the saving in the U.S. and hold most of the wealth. The natural counterpart for t in the model is thus x, the tax rate implicit in tax-exempt yields. This is the after-tax risk-free return to households with incomes above roughly $70,000 under current law and all the reforms. A further complicating factor in the determination of the impact of tax reform on interest rates is the net foreign demand for U.S. capital. Unless foreign countries cut their marginal tax rates on interest income or move their interest rates pan passu with those in the U.S., a decline in U.S. interest rates would represent a decline in after-tax returns to foreigners. As a result capital would flow out of the U.S. and domestic interest rates would not need to fall as much to bring the demand and supply of capital in the U.S. into balance.
In the extreme case of no adjustment in foreign taxes or interest rates and perfectly elastic international capital flows, U.S. interest rates would not fall at all but the U.S. capital stock would, the fall being greater the larger is the decline in interest rates computed from the fixed-capital stock model. A more balanced view would incorporate less than perfectly elastic capital flows and significant changes in foreign interest rates in response to movements in U.S. rates. Thus a fall in foreign demand for U.S. capital would tend to dampen the decline in U.S. rates, but not eliminate it.
For Treasury II and Kemp-Kasten, the domestic and foreign supply of capital responses are offsetting. Because the decline in interest rates necessary to maintain real after-tax interest returns to domestic savers is greater than that generated by the fixed-capital model, interest rates will tend to fall by more than the latter calculation and the U.S. capital stock would tend to grow. On the other hand, any decline in U.S. rates induces a movement of capital abroad which tends to limit the decline. Thus, the direction of bias in the rate declines computed from the fixed-capital stock model is uncertain.
For Treasury I and Bradley-Gephardt, the domestic saving response (weakly)
reinforces the dampening influence of the foreign response, i.e., the level of taxable interest rates necessary to maintain tax-exempt yields is higher than that generated by the fixed capital stock model. We ran alternative simulations for rate declines equal to two-thirds those produced by the fixed-capital model. 
FOOTNOTES
l.This does not mean we believe the plans to be revenue-neutral. In particular, Kemp-Kasten clearly is not. We analyze it nonetheless because its proinvestment features are unique among the reforms.
2.We do not consider the impact of imperfect loss offsets. For an analysis of these and other details of corporate taxation, see Auerbach (1983) .
3.This is only true, of course, if the i's in equation (1) are the same for all assets. In fact, the i'S are zero for owner-occupied housing. Given this fact, expensing for depreciable assets and the nondeductibility of property taxes on owner-occupied housing would lead to tax neutrality -p -d = r for both depreciable assets and owner-occupied housing --but setting tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation would not.
4.
Optimal bond trading is discussed in Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984) .
Other sources of the low implicit yield in longer-term tax exempts are the greater risk of losses due to default and call on municipals relative to Treasuries and the 80 percent limitation of the portion of interest on indebtedness to carry tax exempts that commercial banks can deduct.
5.Sixty percent of owning households with incomes under $15,000 in 1983 had house-to-income ratios exceeding 4, suggesting that the households were retired, and did not have a mortgage. In contrast, eighty percent of owning households with incomes over $25,000 had mortgages and only five percent with incomes above $25,000 had house-to-income ratios above 4.
6.The National Association of Homebuilders (1985, p.51 ) assumes a 14 percent value for e when is six percent. This inflation rate translates into a taxexempt rate just above 8 percent in our model and thus a risk premium of about 6 percent. Price-Waterhouse has used an e of 16 percent in their calculations.
7. Hendershott (1981) discusses why midway values would be expected.
8.The impact of (l-b) on p is (l-TZ)/(l-T) (l+ir), ignoring the effect on z.
The impact on p-I, the risk-adjusted hurdle rate, is thus [T(l-z)-lr(l-T)]/(l-T) (l+Tr). With z = = 0.5, the two and a half percentage point greater (1-b)J for risky assets raises p-by just over a percentage point. 9.The model is both an extension and simplification of that used by Hendershott and Shilling (1982) to analyze the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The extension is a more detailed treatment of nonresidential capital; the simplification is an exogenous specification of risk premia. Gravelle (1985) uses a somewhat similar model to analyze Treasury I.
lO.The rental costs for 3-and 5-year equipment were seen in Table 2 15.This statement would seem to be at variance with the sharp shift to homeownership in the 1970s. The latter occurred because interest rates did not fully reflect expected general inflation and expected house price inflation likely far exceeded expected general inflation.
16.If Kemp-Kasten were made revenue neutral by increasing tax rates (marginal and average) on capital income, the decline in interest rates would be less. Sources: Data for all assets except inventories and public utilities are from Musgrave (1984) . The inventory data are from the Federal Reserve (1984) and the public utility data are based on the fractions given in Gravelle (1982) , i.e., 28 percent of nonresidential structures are public utilities and 33 percent of these have a 10-year tax life.
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